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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Martin

Edmo

from

appeals

Ish

his

conviction and sentence

for

voluntary

manslaughter with a persistent Violator enhancement.

Statement

Of The

The

state

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

charged Ish With second-degree murder for killing Eugene Red Elk, With

deadly weapon and persistent Violator enhancements.

(R., pp.

321-24, 347-48, 983-84.)

The matter proceeded t0 jury trial. The evidence showed that on June

was

ejected from the

—p. 481,
p.

Bourbon Barrel

L. 12; p. 482, Ls. 2-22; p. 490, L. 16

494, Ls. 12-16.)

He then went to

549, L. 3; p. 556, L. 16
L. 23; p. 630, L. 12

726, L. 5

— p.

L. 16; p. 726, L. 5

756, L. 25; p. 760, L. 7
L. 16; p. 1205, L. 7

—

762, L.

—p. 1215,

The jury convicted
enhancement.

p.

23 —p. 494, L.

— p.

— p.

564, L. 24; p. 619, L. 12

—p. 643,

L. 10; p. 664, L. 18

L. 14; p. 669, L. 2

L. 15; p. 736, L. 11

8; p.

3;

483, L. 16; p. 494, Ls. 19-25; p. 541, L. 15

— p. 567,

—p. 727,

p.

L. 13; p. 491, L.

When Red Elk later left Duffy’s

564, L. 25

L. 15; p. 480, L. 17

Elk,

L. 21; p. 641, L. 10

727, L. 15.)

p.

—

2009, Ish

Red

562, L. 5; p. 563, L. 6

p.

—p. 632,

and killed him. (TL,

—p. 693,

—

—p. 491,

— p. 478,

Duffy’s tavern, where he was also ejected by

the bar’s bouncer. (T12, p. 482, L. 23

8; p.

Bar. (T12, p. 477, L. 15

14,

— p.

— p.

—p. 668,

Tavern, Ish attacked

— p.

627,

L.

him

671, L. 15; p. 687, L. 9

737, L. 21; p. 749, L. 25

— p.

801, L. 5 —p. 825, L. 16; p. 848, L. 11 —p. 864,

L. 13; State’s Exhibits 44, 42(2).)

Ish of voluntary manslaughter and a persistent Violator

(R., pp. 1225-26.)

The

district court

imposed a sentence 0f 15 years with

10 years determinate. (R., pp. 1304-06.) Ish ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal. (R., pp. 132327.)

ISSUES
0n appeal

Ish states the issues

Did the

State Violate

challenges t0 strike

II.

Did the

as:

Mr. Ish’s rights

all six

to equal protection

When it used its peremptory

minority venire persons from the jury?

district court err in

quashing Mr. Ish’s subpoena duces tecum for the

prosecution’s voir dire notes?

III.

Did the

district court err in

admitting unreliable in-court witness identiﬁcations?

IV.

Did the

district court err in

admitting prohibited 404(b) propensity evidence?

Did

the district court err in denying Mr. Ish’s motion for dismissal and then a jury

instruction based

VI.

Did

VII.

Did these

0n the

State’s spoliation

0f evidence?

the district court err in answering the jury’s question by telling
manslaughter elements “produced” and “cause” were synonyms?

errors in the aggregate deprive

Mr. Ish 0f his right

it

that the

t0 a fair trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has

Ish failed t0

state’s

Has
that

Has

show clear error in the district court’s factual ﬁndings that the
peremptory challenges were based 0n race-neutral reasons?

show an abuse 0f discretion in the district court’s determination
the prosecutor’s trial notes are protected by the work product doctrine?
Ish failed t0

Ish failed to

show any

legal basis

why

testimony identifying him was

inadmissible?

Has

Ish failed t0 demonstrate that the district court abused

its

discretion by allowing

presentation 0f evidence 0f Ish’s activities earlier in the evening of the homicide?

Has Ish failed t0 show
Youngblood Violation?
Has

Ish failed t0

show

error in the district court’s determination there

that voluntary

and involuntary manslaughter have different

causation elements?

Has

was n0

Ish failed t0 demonstrate cumulative error?

ARGUMENT
I.

Ish

Has Failed To Show Clear Error
State’s

A.

In

The

District Court’s Factual Findings

Peremptorv Challenges Were Based

That The

On Race-Neutral Reasons

Introduction

Ish

made

a

(TL, p. 407, L. 14

m1
—

p.

challenge to the prosecution’s use 0f peremptory challenges.

408, L.

The

regarding jury selection:

The

5.)

initial

district court

made

the following factual ﬁndings

jury panel included 38 potential jurors out 0f 96

potential jurors. (R., p. 1093.) After voir dire, the parties passed the panel for cause. (Id.)

The parties then employed their peremptory challenges.
and African American, asserted
they were racial minorities.
potential jurors

was not

that jurors

1, 3,

(Id.) Ish,

21, 23, 36, and 37

(R., pp. 1096-97.)

Although the

Who

is

Native American

were dismissed because

racial identity

of the six

established in voir dire, the state stipulated, for purposes of the

motion, that the six potential jurors were

The prosecution represented

that

members of racial
its

minorities. (R., p. 1097.)

grounds for striking potential juror

1

was

that

he would be distracted because serving 0n a jury would be a hardship given his occupation

and family needs.

(Id.)

The

district court

noted that potential juror 1’s questionnaire

“explained in detail the hardship serving 0n a jury would cause him in relation to work and
his family situation.”

jurors

(Id.)

The

district court

speciﬁcally found that Caucasian potential

had also been struck by the prosecution on grounds 0f work and family hardship.

(R., pp. 1100-01.)

The prosecution’s ground
stated

1

for striking potential juror

“knowledge of the case due

Batson

V.

to

media

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

attention,”

number

3

was

that she

which had been the reason

had

for a

prior change of venue, and the state had moved to strike her for cause before using its
peremptory challenge. (R., p. 1098.)
The prosecution used its peremptory challenge on potential juror 21 based on his
demeanor. (Id.) Specifically, he appeared angry at having to be there, was disinterested in
participating in the proceedings, and was reluctant to offer information through voir dire.
(Id.) The district court found this was a “reasonable explanation for [the] challenge.” (Id.)
The reason for the peremptory challenge of potential juror 23 was based on
information she provided through voir dire. (Id.) Specifically, she stated that she was the
victim of domestic abuse and wondered what would happen to her, “depending on her vote,
if Ish were released.” (R., pp. 1098-99.) She also “related employment concerns with her
and her family and how that would play out with her children and their economic wellbeing.” (R., p. 1099.)
The prosecution exercised its peremptory challenge on potential juror 36 because
she “expressed concerns about leaving her 18 month old daughter for the duration of the
trial,” “expressed work concerns and being shorthanded at her place of employment,” and
“related an experience about a friend whose daughter was a homicide victim and that she
did not feel like it was resolved correctly.” (Id.) Again, the district court specifically found
that Caucasian potential jurors had also been struck by the prosecution on grounds of work
and family hardship. (R., pp. 1100-01.)
The prosecution’s ground for its peremptory challenge of potential juror 37 was
that she had stated in voir dire that she believed her uncle had been wrongly convicted of
second-degree murder for an “event [that] had occurred at or around a bar.” (R., p. 1099.)
The prosecution had initially tried to keep this potential juror off the jury for cause. (Id.)

4

After considering the reasons presented

and events

by

the prosecution in light of the record

concluded that the reasons for the peremptory

in court, the district court

challenges to the six potential jurors at issue were “all race neutral.” (R., p.
the prosecution

t0

1

101.)

Because

had presented race-neutral explanations, and those reasons “d0 not appear

be a mask for hiding discrimination but are based 0n reasons” developed through the

questionnaires and voir dire, the defense did not meet

its

burden 0f proving purposeful

discrimination. (R., pp. 1101-02?)
Ish contends he

made a prima facie showing 0f discrimination in the

of six minority potential jurors. (Appellant’s
in large part

brief, pp. 11-12.)

based upon the prosecution’s stipulation

not dispute this ﬁnding by the
discriminatory reasons for

its

trial court.

district court so

(R., pp. 1096-97),

and the

found,

state

does

Ish next argues that the state failed to give non-

challenges. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) This argument

frivolous. Finally, Ish argues that the district court’s factual

justiﬁcations

The

state’s striking

is

ﬁndings that the race-neutral

were the bases of the peremptory challenges are clearly erroneous.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-22.)

Review of the record and

application 0f the relevant legal

standards shows this argument t0 be without basis.

Standard

B.

Of Review

Whether a “proffered reason”
Protection Clause

is

for a

peremptory challenge violates the Equal

a question 0f law that this Court reviews de novo.

156 Idaho 727, 732, 330 P.3d 1085, 1090

(Ct.

State V.

Omelas,

App. 2014). However, a trial court’s ﬁnding

regarding “the validity of the state’s explanation for exercising peremptory challenges 0n

2

The

district court also

418, L.

9 —p. 419,

denied a motion for reconsideration of the Batson claim. (TL,

L. 19.)

p.

minority jurors”

is

856 P.2d 872, 876

Idaho

court’s

trial

0n appeal only

The

856 P.2d

District

Supported

State V. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 86,

error.

ﬁnding With regard t0 the

if it is clearly

Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 933, 935 P.2d

at 87,

C.

“[T]he

(1 993).

Will be overturned

State V.

reviewed 0n appeal for clear

state’s explanation

erroneous in light of the facts as a Whole.”

183, 196 (Ct.

App. 1997)

(citing Araiza,

124

at 877).

Law And

Court Properly Applied The

Its

Factual Findings Are

BV The Record

Exclusion 0f a prospective juror based on race

is

constitutionally impermissible;

however, a party is otherwise “entitled t0 exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any
reason

at all, as

long as that reason

case.” Batson V. Kentucky,

related t0

is

View concerning the outcome of the

[its]

476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).

A court applies a three-step test when

considering Whether the use 0f a peremptory challenge

124 Idaho

at 87,

856 P.2d

must make a prima

at 877.

showing

facie

State V. Foster, 152 Idaho 88, 91,

A

was

racially motivated.

“First, the party objecting t0 the

that the challenge

prima facie case of discrimination

peremptory challenge

was exercised on

266 P.3d 1193, 1196

(Ct.

ALiza,

App. 201

the basis of race.”

1) (citations omitted).

exists if the challenged juror “is a

member of

a

cognizable racial group” and the juror was challenged in order to “remove from the jury

members 0f the defendant’s
Once

a party has

race.” Li.

met

its

burden of showing a prima facie case 0f a

motivated peremptory challenge, the burden
articulate a “clear

Who made

the challenge t0

and reasonably speciﬁc” race-neutral explanation for

Foster, 152 Idaho at 91,

juror’s

shifts to the party

266 P.3d

at

1196

(citing Batson,

demeanor can be a race-neutral explanation

for a

476 U.S.

racially-

at 94).

its

decision.

“A

potential

peremptory challenge

t0 a juror.”

Foster, 152 Idaho at 91,

266 P.3d

“Unless a discriminatory intent

deemed

Will be

Hernandez

V.

is

1196

(citing Thaler V.

m

500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)

(plurality)).

peremptory challenge, the party

Violation has the burden 0f persuading the court that, despite the

explanation, the peremptory challenge

race.

FLter, 152 Idaho

at 91,

is

the result 0f purposeful discrimination based

on

m,

In

266 P.3d

at

1196

(citing

considering Whether there has been purposeful discrimination, a

its

own observations

1196

at

476 U.S.

trial

court

during voir dire and whether the demeanor 0f the party

the peremptory challenge “belies a discriminatory intent.”

P.3d

(2010)).

Purkett V. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (quoting

If a race-neutral explanation is given for the

claiming a

Hames, 559 U.S. 43

inherent in the [proffered] explanation, the reason offered

race neutral.”

New York,

at

“The determinations 0f

(citations omitted).

peculiarly within the

trial

Court] will defer to the

m,

may
who

152 Idaho

credibility

at 98).

consider

exercised

at 91,

266

and demeanor

lie

court’s province and, absent exceptional circumstances, [this

trial

court’s ﬁndings.”

I_d.

In this case the district court applied the correct legal standards. (R., pp. 1095-96.)

After ﬁnding Ish had established a primafacie Batson challenge, the district court detailed
the prosecution’s stated explanations for exercising peremptory challenges against the six

challenged potential jurors, and found those stated explanations to be race-neutral and

supported by the record.
failed t0

fact

meet

his

(R., pp.

1096-1 101.) The

district court

then found that Ish had

burden of proving that the basis for the preemptory challenges were in

based 0n purposeful discrimination instead 0f the race-neutral justiﬁcations offered by

the prosecution.

(R., pp. 1101-02.)

The

district court correctly

concluded that the stated

grounds for the peremptory challenges (family and economic hardship, knowledge of case

through media, demeanor, and potential prejudice) were race-neutral.
also correctly concluded that the concerns

The

district court

were premised upon information the potential

jurors provided in their questionnaires or in response t0 questions in voir dire, 0r based

0n

in-court observations. Thus, the law and the record support the district court’s ﬁndings of

fact

and conclusion.

The Prosecution Did Provide Non-Discriminatorv Reasons For

1.

Its

Peremptory Challenges
Ish ﬁrst argues that the prosecution “did not provide deﬁnitive reasons

each juror, just vague and inconclusive notes.” (Appellant’s

brief, p. 13.)

must give a clear and reasonably speciﬁc explanation of
exercising the challenges.”

m,

the defendant’s case merely

his

good

omitted).

faith in

476 U.S.

by denying

making individual

it

he had a discriminatory motive or afﬁrming

preemptory challenge. (TL,

p.

409, L. 11

it

The

district court correctly

and brackets

faith or generally

its

deny

challenges

by

based the decision to exercise each respective

— p. 413,

The prosecution did not offer mere

faith.

good

gave clear and reasonably speciﬁc explanations for

upon Which

0f good

his legitimate reasons for

selections.” Li. at 98 (internal quotations

articulating the information

frivolous.

“The prosecutor

The prosecution does not “rebut

In this case the prosecution did not merely claim

racial bias. Rather,

is

that

at 98, n.20.

Why it struck

L. 16; R., pp. 1114-21.) Ish’s

argument

denials of discriminatory motive 0r claims

found that the prosecution articulated a clear and

reasonably speciﬁc race-neutral explanation for

its

peremptory challenges.

2.

Statistics

Do Not

Create

An

Irrebuttable Presumption

Of

Purposeful

Discrimination
Ish next contends that the district court incorrectly concluded that he failed to prove

purposeful discrimination despite the race-neutral reasons. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-22.)

He

ﬁrst argues that the fact that the prosecution challenged

alone proves purposeful discrimination.

all six

minority potential jurors

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14- 1 6.)

This argument

does not Withstand scrutiny.

An issue of “Whether the prosecution acted With a race-based reason When striking
prospective jurors”

may

be raised by

“statistical

evidence alone.” Miller-El

V. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003). However, a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges “‘Will not be
held unconstitutional solely because

it

results in a racially disproportionate impact...

of racially discriminatory intent or purpose

is

required t0

show

Proof

a Violation 0f the Equal

Protection C1ause.’” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60 (plurality opinion) (quoting Arlington

Heights

Even

V.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977)).

“the prosecutor’s removal 0f

all

black persons on the venire”

still

requires analysis

0fthe prosecutor’s stated reasons for the exercise ofperemptory challenges and Will require
relief

only

if there is

a showing of purposeful discrimination.

m,

476 U.S.

at 100.

Thus, although the fact that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges resulted in a an

White jury was enough to

enough
light

t0

show

make

a

prima facie claim of discriminatory purpose,

clear error in the district court’s

applicable legal standards.

not

ﬁnding of no discriminatory purpose

of the prosecution’s articulation ofrace-neutral reasons for

T0 hold otherwise would

it is

a11-

its

in

peremptory challenges.

create an irrebuttable presumption that

is

contrary t0 the

The

3.

District

Court Did Not Clearly Err In Considering That Other Struck

Non—Minoritv Jurors Were Similarly Situated
Ish next argues that the district court erred

Caucasian potential jurors

He

brief, pp. 16-19.)

by considering

similarly situated

Who were also excluded 0n peremptory challenges.

then argues that the

situated Caucasian potential jurors

district court erred

who were

(Appellant’s

by not considering

similarly

not excluded by peremptory challenges.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-21.) Neither of Ish’s cake-and-eat-it-too arguments have merit.

In

may make

making

its

determination of Whether there was discriminatory purpose, a court

“side-by—side comparisons of some [minority] venire panelists

and white panelists allowed

t0 serve.” Miller—El V. Dretke,

step

may include

P.3d 1085, 1095

“comparative juror analysis.” State

(Ct.

App. 2014).

V.

struck

545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). Not

striking a similarly situated white potential juror “is evidence tending to

discrimination t0 be considered at Batson’s third step.”

who were

I_d.

Simply

prove purposeful

stated,

W’s

third

Omelas, 156 Idaho 727, 737, 330

In this case the district court found that

two of the

minority potential jurors were peremptorily challenged because of work and family
hardship issues. (R., p. 1100.) After noting that almost every juror faces

hardship for serving on a jury,

it

found that two Caucasian potential jurors

dismissed were similarly situated, which the

0f discriminatory
Ish’s

intent.

argument

district court

it

Who were

also

considered t0 be evidence of lack

(Id.)

that the district court erred

because

it

lacked evidence of

prosecution struck the similarly situated Caucasian potential jurors

because

some degree of

Why

the

may be easily dismissed

“[C]omparative juror analysis” involves evaluating

lacks any basis in law.

“relevant information about the jurors that were dismissed and the jurors that were

empaneled.”

Omelas, 156 Idaho

at

738, 330 P.3d at 1096.
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If a prosecutor is treating

minority potential jurors differently than similarly situated white potential jurors that

evidence of discriminatory

intent.

that similarly situated White jurors

I_d.

The

district court

is

properly concluded that the fact

were also struck was evidence of lack of discriminatory

purpose.
Ish’s next argument, that the district court should

Who were

potential jurors

statement of the law, but

some degree ofwork

have considered some White

not struck as being similarly situated,

fails

0n

its facts.

As

is

based 0n a correct

the district court noted,

most jurors have

or family hardship because ofjury service. (R., p. 1100.) Therefore,

the district court considered only potential jurors

work

related stresses

(Id.)

Ish’s ability to point t0

Who

“clearly and forcefully expressed

above and beyond other prospective jurors”

to

be similarly

situated.

empaneled jurors who expressed some degree of hardship

therefore falls short 0f showing clear error.

Ish claims that the district court clearly erred

9, 20,

and 25, Who were empaneled,

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.)

show

clear error

by the

t0

by not considering

be “similarly situated”

The evidence he

cites

potential jurors 4,

t0 struck minority jurors.

does not support his claim,

much less

district court.

Potential juror 4 checked “n0” in response to question 102 0f whether “personal or

other concerns” might “be distracting during a

trial.”

(CSeat, p. 14.)

where he would be sequestered

would

create

he stated

that,

possible t0

although he

is

for 8-10 days

self—employed, “this

work around 8-10 days.” (CSeat,

situated to jurors

who

felt

is

p. 15.)

When asked if a trial

“undue or extreme hardship”

a slow time of year and
Potential juror 4

they would suffer undue 0r extreme hardship.

11

was not

it’s

very

similarly

Potential juror 9 stated, in relation to the question of whether he would suffer
“undue or extreme hardship,” that he was a truck driver, not sure when he would be in the
state, and “can’t really afford to be off work for two weeks.” (CSeat, p. 68.) However, he
did not speak up when the venire was questioned about hardship. (Tr., p. 270, L. 10 – p.
292, L. 9.) Ultimately, potential juror 9’s concern that he would lose income put him in
the same situation as almost all of the jurors who would have to take time away from work
to serve on the jury. As the district court reasoned, almost “every juror on the panel would
presumably have a work issue,” so similarly situated jurors were those who “clearly and
forcefully expressed work related stresses above and beyond other prospective jurors.” (R.,
p. 1100.) Potential juror 9 does not fall within that category.
Ish next identifies potential juror 20 as someone who had family and work related
hardships so as to be similarly situated with the jurors peremptorily struck for potential
distraction due to hardships. (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) She did state that she had a concern
of being distracted because she was on an adoption waiting list and had a three-year-old
child and a family. (CSeat, p. 157.) She did raise concerns about being away from her
three-year-old, but also stated that she understood what the judge was saying about not
being able to release everyone with some difficulty in serving on the jury. (Tr., p. 294, Ls.
14-16.) She also expressed concerns because she was an educator and hoped to be able to
grade papers on her computer so she would not “fall behind.” (Tr., p. 294, Ls. 6-10.)
However, the district judge informed her that it would be possible to “work that out with
the marshals” to allow her internet access for that purpose. (Tr., p. 294, L. 11 – p. 295, L.
5.) Ish’s argument that the district court committed clear error by not finding potential
juror 20 similarly situated is unpersuasive.

12

made her

similarly

situated With challenged jurors. (Appellant’s brief, p. 2 1 .) Juror 25 wrote that her

“husband

Finally, Ish asserts that potential juror 25’s family situation

might have a hard time taking care of my children and working

at the

same time.” (CSeat,

p. 176.)

That her husband “might” have a hard time being a single parent for a few days

does not

make

potential juror 25 similarly situated to the struck jurors.

Concerns about the amount of hardship a potential juror would undergo as a
0f being 0n the jury, and whether those concerns might cause

distraction,

result

was a non-racial

ground for exercising peremptory challenges. The prosecution was not in a position, nor

would

it

be desirable t0 even

try, to strike

every potential juror With some degree 0f

hardship in serving on the jury. That Virtually

all

0f the jurors would suffer some

sort

of

deprivation as a result of serving on the jury did not render clearly erroneous the district
court’s factual

ﬁnding

The

4.

that Ish

had not proven purposeful discrimination.

District Court’s

For Cause

Misstatement Regarding

On Potential Juror 3

Ish also argues that because he,

it

was

the defense that

17-19), he fails to explain

counsel

moved

why this

The Challenge

and not the prosecution, challenged potential juror

(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.) Although Ish

3 for cause, the district court erred.

his assertion that

Who Made

Is Irrelevant

is

moved t0

strike the juror for

is

cause (TL,

correct in

p. 194, Ls.

relevant to the analysis. Indeed, the fact that defense

t0 strike for cause supports the district court’s

ﬁnding

juror’s concerns over her fairness because 0f pre-trial publicity

that the potential

was a

valid, non-racial

grounds for exercising a peremptory challenge.

The
reasons for

district court

its

discrimination

found that Ish had failed to prove that the prosecution’s stated

exercise of peremptory challenges

was the true reason.

Ish has failed to

13

was not

show

true

and

that purposeful

clear error in that factual ﬁnding.

II.

Ish

Has Shown N0 Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s Determination That The
Prosecutor’s Trial Notes Are Protected BV The Work Product Doctrine

A.

Introduction

After

trial,

on the prosecution a subpoena duces tecum

the defense served

for “A11

written communication and documentation of the prosecuting attorney’s staff pertaining t0

prospective jurors and voir dire, including but not limited

notes,

County.”

and Whether pertaining

(R., p. 1252.)

The

state

1250.)

The

district court

t0 the jury panels in

moved to quash the subpoena

“unreasonable, oppressive, and requests

work product not

with applicable legal standards. (Appellant’s
that the

is

mere

fact

he made a

m

Bannock or Twin

or limit

its

scope as

subject to disclosure.”

Falls

it

was

(R., p.

asserting

it

did not act consistently

brief, pp. 22-30.) Ish’s

challenge entitled

him

t0

argument, essentially

subpoena the prosecutor’s

notes, is Without merit.

Standard

Of Review

The

court’s rulings

trial

0n discovery “will not be disturbed on appeal unless there

a manifest abuse of discretion.” State V. Bailey, 94 Idaho 285, 290, 486 P.2d 998, 1003

(1971), overruled 0n other grounds

C.

in preparation ofjury

granted the motion. (R., pp. 1287-1291.)

On appeal Ish argues that the district court erred,

B.

hand written or typed

any memos, any text messages, and any e-mail, whether made

selection or after,

trial

to, all

The Prosecution’s

Trial

bV

State V. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 761 P.2d 1158 (1988).

Notes Are Protected

Work Product

The Idaho Criminal Rules speciﬁcally exempt
discovery, including “legal research,” “records,

14

99

(6

the prosecutor’s

work product from

correspondence,” and “reports 0r

memoranda

t0 the extent that they contain the opinions, theories 0r conclusions

prosecuting attorney or

An

members of the prosecuting

attorney’s notes, taken in the course of a

district court

0f the

trial

attorney’s legal staff.” I.C.R. 16(g).

work

are the epitome of

trial,

0f the

product.

The

did not err in concluding the prosecutor’s notes related to the voir dire portion

were not subj ect

t0 discovery.

Ish contends that the prosecutor’s trial notes are subject to discovery. (Appellant’s

He

brief, pp. 25-26.)

Rather, he relies

upon an unpublished order by a

habeas petitioner

federal

how Rule

does not address, however,

entitled

is

t0

civil

16(g) permits this discovery.

federal magistrate concluding that a

discovery,

including to

subpoena the

prosecutor’s notes. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26 (citing Johnson V. Finn, 2007

(E.D. Ca. 2007).) However, Idaho has

(habeas) petitioner

may utilize

148, 139 P.3d 741,

750

(Ct.

its

own

civil discovery.

legal standards of

when

a post-conviction

E, gg, Mugphy V. State,

App. 2006) (“The

district court is

WL 323253

143 Idaho 139,

discovery ‘unless necessary to protect an applicant’s substantial rights.’” (quoting

M,

121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App. 1992»). Ish’s argument that any

defendant making a Batson challenge
notes

is

Without legal basis and
Ish also

compares

is

is

simply entitled t0 inspect the prosecutor’s

The

state

trial

inconsistent With I.C.R. 16(g).

his request for the prosecutor’s trial notes t0 a request for

exculpatory information under Brady V. Maryland, 373 U.S. 88

p. 26.)

m

not required to order

(1 963).

(Appellant’s brief,

has a duty t0 provide exculpatory materials automatically. I.C.R. 16(a).

Rule 16 does not give a defendant carte blanche

to

g0 through the prosecutor’s work

product in hopes of turning up exculpatory information,
a confession t0 racial motivation. I.C.R. 16(g).
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much

less in

hopes 0f turning up

Ish next contends he

trial

was

entitled t0

an

in

camera inspection of the prosecutor’s

camera inspection by

notes. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.) Ish did not request an in

the district court. (TL, p. 1680, L. 3

— p.

request for an in camera inspection

44534, 2019
erred in

is

therefore not preserved.

— p.

1683, L. 15.)

The

State V. Gonzalez,

N0.

1682, L. 11; p. 1682, L. 24

WL 693765, at *4 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019) (“We Will not hold that a trial court

making a decision 0n an

the opportunity to address.”).

Whether the

entire

issue or a party’s position

on an issue

that

Moreover, the authority upon which Ish

m

second step of the

demonstrate a race-neutral ground for

its

it

relies addresses

analysis—Where the prosecution must

peremptory challenges—should be conducted

E, gg, United States V. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir.

camera.

did not have

in

1987) (cited

Appellant’s brief, p. 26).
Finally, Ish argues the district court erred

him

t0 demonstrate a

state to

show

that

establish

brief, pp. 29-30.)

more than

However, by

district court

work product

Ish’s

that the materials are outside the scope

covered by the work product doctrine

the

and requiring

compliance with the subpoena would be “unreasonable or oppressive”

work product beyond the scope 0f discovery.

The

I.C.R. 16(g)

need for discovery of the work product instead of compelling the

under I.C.R. 17(b). (Appellant’s
16(g) puts

by applying

is

its

plain language I.C.R.

argument

that the state

must

of discovery because they are

meritless and senseless.

properly concluded that Ish had presented no Viable reason

doctrine did not apply t0 the prosecutor’s

trial

notes,

why

and no reason

t0

pierce that general lack 0f discoverability. (R., p. 1290.) Ish’s arguments that the district

court abused

its

discretion are without merit.
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III.

Ish

Has Failed T0 Show The

District

Court Abused

Its

Discretion

BV Allowing His

In-

Court Identiﬁcation
A.

Introduction

Ish

moved

to exclude

any in-court identiﬁcation of him by witnesses Shirlene

Bowen, Robert Hess, Heather Davis, Jonathan Gilbert, Jody Walker,
Hill.

(R., pp. 741-42.)

He

— p.

53, L. 12; p. 55, L.

in limine, contingent

At trial, over defense
at the

20 — p. 57, L.

0n proper foundation

843-45; Supp. Tr., p. 57, L. 13

been

Haws, 0r Genny

argued that the Witness identiﬁcations were unreliable because

0fthe passage oftime and exposure to additional information.3
p. 51, L. 18

Jesse

— p.

25; p. 486, Ls. 8-15; p. 490, L. 7

basis for overruling the obj ection

The

district court

738-40; Supp.

Tr.,

denied the motion

for identiﬁcation being laid at

trial.

(R., pp.

58, L. 2.)

obj ection, Linda

Bourbon Barrel Bar on

12.)

(R., pp.

Wood and Jenny Hill identiﬁed Ish as having

the night of the homicide. (TL, p. 477, L. 8

—

p.

492, L.

6; p.

497, Ls. 19-24.)

The

— p. 479,

L.

district court’s

was that ifthe foundation established personal knowledge

under I.R.E. 602 the evidence was admissible, and any issues of reliability went to weight
0fthe testimony. (Supp.

On

Tr., 57, Ls.

23-25; Tr., p. 486, Ls. 13-15; p. 497, Ls. 22-24.)

appeal, Ish contends the district court abused

its

discretion

by

“fail[ing] t0

analyze Whether the probative value 0f the evidence was outweighed by the prejudice.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-35.) Ish’s argument fails as a matter of law because there

is

unfair prejudice in the evidence and the district court properly concluded the question

no

was

one 0f weight t0 be determined by the jury.

3

The

district court

by Heather Davis.

had already denied a motion
(R., pp. 715-21.)
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to suppress the out-of—court identiﬁcation

Standard

B.

“The
is

shown

to

trial

Of Review
court’s I.R.E.

403 determination Will not be disturbed 0n appeal unless

be an abuse of discretion.” State

it

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d

V.

918, 921 (2010).

Has Failed T0 Show AnV Unfair Prejudice, Much Less That The District Court
Erred BV Not Finding Such Alleged Unfair Preiudice Substantially Outweighed
The Probative Value Of The Identiﬁcation Evidence

C.

Ish

“Evidence, although relevant,

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice.” State
P.2d 21

1,

217

(Ct.

App. 1998)

V.

Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 603, 977

“I.R.E.

(citing I.R.E. 403).

403 requires the

trial

court t0

balance the probative and the prejudicial nature 0f the evidence presented and t0 determine

whether

t0

admit the evidence.” State

V.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 765, 864 P.2d 596,

603 (1993).
Evidence

is

unfairly prejudicial only if it “tends t0 suggest decision

basis.” State V. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905,

that

908

(Ct.

App. 1994).

merely “go[es] to the weight 0f the evidence” in the sense that

probative value” does not render the evidence unfairly prejudicial.

Idaho 61, 66, 951 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Ct. App. 1998).

“[I]t is the

0n an improper

it

Any factor

“may reduce

State V.

its

Brown, 131

province of the jury t0

determine the credibility of the Witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable
inferences t0 be

drawn from the evidence.”

State V.

631 (2015). Where, as here, the only prejudice
testimony, such “does not

Here, as in
the

make

m,

it

that the jury

might believe the proffered

excludable under Rule 403.” Li.

the claimed

Bourbon Barrel Bar g0 only

is

Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628,

ﬂaws

in the testimony identifying Ish as being at

to credibility.

18

Ish

is

contending that the evidence

is

so

inherently unbelievable that he

evidence.

would be

That the jury, making

believe the Witnesses’ testimony

its

is

own

unfairly prejudiced if the jury believed the

credibility

and weight determinations, might

not unfair prejudice.

The

district court

properly

concluded that Ish’s objections went to weight 0f the evidence, and therefore did not abuse
its

discretion in overruling Ish’s objection.

Ish identiﬁes

Rather, he

no unfair prejudice

in the testimony.

makes generalized and vague claims regarding

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3 1-35.)
the unreliability 0f eyewitness

identiﬁcation, With assertions that the circumstances of this case

unreliable. (Id.4) Ish

determination

is

Finally,

is

requesting this Court to

reserved to the jury.

He has

make

failed t0

from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error

the error

is

which point the

State shall

would be

the

“In other words, the error

same without

P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (citing State
Ish admitted he

shall

was

at

V.

4

“A defendant appealing

have the duty

to establish that

have the burden 0f demonstrating

the error.” State V.

V. Perry,

harmless

is

that

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245

if the

Court ﬁnds that the

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)).

Bourbon Barrel and

that

he was kicked out of the

Exhibit 46(2).) The evidence Ish challenges on appeal

Any

show an abuse of discretion.

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
result

at

the testimony

a credibility determination—but that

even ifthere had been error the error was harmless.

such an error occurred,

show

error in admission 0f testimony

by

is

cumulative to his

bar.

(State’s

own statements.

the employees 0f Bourbon Barrel identifying Ish

Below Ish advocated for application of a reliability standard applicable under due process.

(R., p. 739.)

On

appeal Ish recognizes that this due process standard applies only where

an identiﬁcation has been procured through
(citing Perry V.

New Hampshire,

state suggestiveness.

565 U.S. 228 (2012)).)
19

(Appellant’s brief, p. 31

as being at

conﬁrmed

and being kicked out of the Bourbon Barrel was harmless because Ish himself
the correctness of that testimony. Ish’s claim that the testimony

meritless and even if it

is

had merit any

error

was

unreliable

was harmless.

IV.
Ish Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Allowing Presentation Of Evidence Of Ish’s Activities Earlier In The Evening Of The
Homicide

A.

Introduction
Ish ﬁled a very broad pre-trial obj ection t0 “testimony 0f the Defendant’s conduct

and behavior that was witnessed

at the

Burbon

Duffy’s Bar” under I.R.E. 404(b). (R.,

p.

Barrel before the Defendant arrived at

[sic]

1060; Supp. Tr., p. 104, Ls. 5-18.)

same day” was

court stated evidence of “events occurring the

The

“likely going t0

district

come

in,”

but reserved ruling 0n the motion. (Supp. Tr., p. 105, Ls. 7-12.)

At

Ish

trial

Bourbon Barrel
baseball bat.”

narrowed the scope of the objection:

testiﬁed, Ish objected t0

(TL, p. 458, L. 5

—

p.

Before the employees of the

any testimony regarding “alleged

459, L.

5.)

Trial counsel stated that there

obj ection to “the State attempting t0 identify Mr. Ish as the person at the

0r to evidence that he

was “escorted out 0f the

alerted “Duffy’s bar t0 be

0n the lookout

for

threats

Bourbon

and

was no
Barrel,”

bar,” 0r to evidence that the employees

Mr.

Ish.”

prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible to

(TL, p. 458, Ls. 5-14.)

show

state

The

of mind and motive

because the events were so close in time that they were “intertwined” and the evidence

would show

Ish

was

“still in that

thrown out 0f Duffy’s.

(Tr., p.

angered, agitated state of mind”

When he

entered and

was

459, Ls. 7-19.) The district court overruled the objection,

holding that evidence 0f threats prior to a battery “does

20

come

in

under Rule 404(b) as

t0

state

L.

0f mind and motive because

20 — p. 461, L. 10

At

that Ish attempted t0 steal cigarettes

leave. (Tr., p. 481, Ls. 3-10; p. 492, L. 11

—

p.

494, L. 11.)

The Bourbon Barrel employees then

Duffy’s, resulting in Ish being kicked out of there as well,

8; p.

except for his

p.

— p.

494, Ls. 19-25; p. 556, L. 16

initially refusing to leave

(State’s Exhibit 46(2).)

made. (TL,

— p. 493,

L.

Eventually Ish’s friends escorted Ish from the bar.

(TL, p. 482, Ls. 18-22; p. 493, Ls. 11-13.)

483, L.

459,

refused and got angry. (T12, p. 481, Ls. 11-12; p. 482, Ls. 7-13; p. 493, Ls.

6-10; p. 493, L. 14

— p.

(Tr., p.

Idaho 569, 388 P.3d 583 (2017)).)

and the owner testiﬁed

from the bar and they demanded he
5.) Ish initially

goes directly to an element of the crime.”

(citing State V. Kralovec, 161

the bartender

trial

it

(Tr., p.

564, L. 3.) Ish

and getting angry,

Elk. (TL, p. 482, L. 23

conﬁrmed

these events,

in his interview with police.

Neither the bartender nor owner testiﬁed that any threats were

481, Ls. 13-15; p. 494, Ls. 9-1

angry and yelled

by Red

called

They did

1.)

481, Ls. 11-12; p. 494, Ls. 4-1

1)

testify,

however, that Ish got

and “stepped forward”

(Tr., p.

482, Ls. 2-6), and that the owner obtained a baseball bat she kept behind the bar, which she

used t0 threaten Ish “[b]ecause he wouldn’t leave the bar” When asked (TL,
10; p. 493, L. 14

— p. 494,

Barrel employees regarding his behavior there.

by allowing

the testimony of the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 35-41.)

not challenge the admission 0f his statements to the ofﬁcers.

He

482, Ls. 7-

L. 3).

Ish contends that the district court erred

41.)

p.

Bourbon

He

does

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 35-

argues that the testimony 0f the Bourbon Barrel employees was relevant only t0

propensity.

discretion

outweigh

(Appellant’s brief, p. 39.)

by ﬁnding the
its

He

further argues the district court abused

potential unfair prejudice

from the testimony did not substantially

probative value. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 40-41.) Ish’s appellate arguments

21

its

fail

for several reasons.

trial

First,

most or

all

of Ish’s appellate argument

unpreserved because

is

counsel limited the scope of the obj ection before obtaining a ruling. Second, the issue

of Whether evidence 0f threats was admissible
Third, the evidence that

presented.

presented, if ultimately within the scope 0f the

relevant t0 identity, state 0f mind, and motive. Finally, the district court did

objection,

is

not abuse

its

discretion in admitting the evidence.

preserved and even

Standard

B.

was

moot because n0 such evidence was

is

if Ish

had shown

error the error

In addition, even if the issue

were

was harmless.

Of Review

Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: Whether the
evidence

is

admissible for a purpose other than propensity

is

determination of whether the probative value of the evidence

by

its

potential for unfair prejudice

is

given free review While the
substantially outweighed

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion. State

V. Grist,

147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

Ish

Has Failed To Show

Ish’s appellate

his

argument on appeal

position 0n the issue

An Abuse Of Discretion

argument
is

is

not preserved.

Initially, Ish

must be raised before the

trial

court for

p.

cigarettes

angry.’

9

459, L.

5.)

that

On

it

to

be properly preserved for

WL 693765, at *4 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019).

ultimately limited his objection to evidence 0f threats at the

—

show

preserved for appellate review. “[B]oth the issue and the party’s

appeal.” State V. Gonzalez, N0. 44534, 2019

L. 5

has failed t0

Bourbon

Barrel.

(T12, p.

Ish

458,

appeal he challenges admission of evidence he “was taking

from behind the bar and was then asked
(Appellant’s brief, p. 38.)

to leave, at

which point he became

Because Ish did not object

22

t0 evidence

he took

cigarettes,

evidence that he was asked t0 leave, or evidence that he was angry, this issue

is

not preserved for appellate review.

The

0n Ish’s objection t0 evidence he made threats

district court’s ruling

moot because n0 evidence he made
if

it

threats

was introduced

at trial.

“An issue

is

is

moot

presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination Will have n0 practical

effect

upon the outcome.” Smith V. Smith, 160 Idaho 778, 784, 379 P.3d 1048, 1054 (2016)

(internal quotes

and

was introduced

at trial.

citation omitted).

Any

ruling

evidence 0f threats was admissible
admitted

As set forth above, no evidence that Ish made threats
0n the correctness of the
is

district court’s ruling that

moot because n0 such evidence was

ultimately

at trial.

The evidence
crimes, wrongs, 0r acts

actually admitted at trial

is

was admissible.

“Evidence of other

not admissible t0 prove the character of a person in order t0

show

that the person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b) (2017). “This rule generally

prevents the admission ofprevious bad acts t0 establish a person’s character for the purpose

of showing that the person acted in conformity With that character.” State
Idaho 535, 538, 20 P.3d 719, 722 (Ct. App. 2001).
crimes, wrongs or acts

is

V.

McGuire, 135

Evidence that does not show other

not Within the scope of the rule. State V. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,

722, 23 P.3d 786, 796 (Ct. App. 2001) (evidence 0f defendant’s attraction t0 older, heavy-

set

women “was

Even

if the

not in fact bad acts evidence” and was relevant to establishing motive).

evidence might show bad character and action in conformity therewith,

also relevant t0 a purpose other than the prejudicial

probative value of the evidence

is

one

it is

if

it is

admissible so long as “the

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

23

prejudice.”

State V. Capone, 164 Idaho 118,

_,

426 P.3d 469, 476 (2018)

(internal

citation omitted).

Ish challenges the admission of evidence he

bar.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 38.)

admitted

Even

at trial.

if he had,

steal cigarettes is certainly

character, but

Speciﬁcally,

if

it

show a

act

of

theft,

character 0f Violence.

In other words,

it

does not show

was therefore not Within the scope of I.R.E. 404(b).

could be said that evidence 0f an attempted theft created an inference that the

it

would

still

ej ected

Red Elk’s

this

so marginally unfairly

death. This act of attempted theft led to

from the Bourbon Barrel and then shortly thereafter from Duffy’s, being

being ejected, and the manslaughter 0f the

Evidence 0f

it is

be admissible. Speciﬁcally, the act of attempted theft was the

ﬁrst link in a chain of events leading t0

at

tried t0

of Violence with which he was charged was an act in conformity with his

prejudicial that

mad

Evidence he

Which would show a character 0f

charged act of Violence was an act in conformity with character,

Ish being

error.

evidence 0f other crimes, wrongs, 0r acts that tends t0 prove his

character for dishonesty. This evidence

Even

from behind the

above, he did not object to this evidence being

he would have failed t0 show

shows he attempted an

it

cigarettes

does not tend t0 show that he acted in conformity with that character.

it

dishonesty, but does not

that the act

As noted

“was taking

man who

ejected

him

the second time.

chain 0f events was highly relevant to understanding the events of the

evening in question, and marginally,

at best, indicative that Ish

had a propensity

for

Violence.

Likewise, evidence that Ish became angry upon being told t0 leave the Bourbon
Barrel

is

not evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 0r acts. Rather,

state just before

and

at the

time 0f the crime.

24

Nor was

it

it is

evidence 0f his mental

offered t0 prove Ish’s character

or that he acted in conformity with that character. Evidence that Ish was in an angry mental
state because he had been ejected from the Bourbon Barrel when he met Red Elk, and
continued to be mad when Red Elk ejected him from Duffy’s, was not within the scope of
I.R.E. 404(b).
Even if it was within the scope, the potential for unfair prejudice did not outweigh
the probative value of the evidence. Evidence that Ish was angry when he encountered
Red Elk was highly probative of his mental state, and evidence that he was angry before
but not violent does not suggest a character for violence. The evidence had high probative
value and presented little to no possibility of unfair prejudice.
Ish argues that the evidence shows only his “propensity to become angry” which
“would tend to imply that Mr. Ish had a propensity to commit offenses like the ones charged
in this case.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 39-40.) This argument is not based on the actual
language of the rule. Merely becoming angry is simply not a propensity to commit
violence. To the contrary, it is likely that every juror hearing this case has become angry,
and would not assume that alone shows a propensity for violence. Ish’s argument is
without merit.
Finally, even if there had been an error, the error was harmless under the legal
standard set forth above. Ish’s anger did not result in violence at the Bourbon Barrel.
Beyond a reasonable doubt, the result would be the same without presenting all of the
evidence of the events immediately preceding the crime.
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V.
Ish

A.

Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That The
Surveillance Video Was Not Destroyed In Bad Faith

Introduction

Ish ﬁled a

Tavern relating

motion

t0 the 14th

to

compel an “explanation
15th

and

0f June, 2009.”

for the ‘lost Video’

asserting that the “contents of the original Videocassette tape

transferred to a Digital

pp. 374-75.)

The

Video Disc and the

district court

The

(R., pp. 367-68.)

state

responded,

from Duffy’s Bar were

original Videocassette tape

found the following

from Duffy’s

was destroyed.”

(R.,

facts:

Sometime following the death 0f Eugene L. Red Elk 0n June 14,
2009, a VHS copy of the surveillance Video from Duffy’s Bar was obtained
by the Pocatello Police department. It was entered into evidence storage on
June 17, 2009. On or about September 4, 2012, the tape was destroyed. An
alleged DVD copy of the tape was made, but there is no evidence t0 suggest
who made the copy, if the copy is an accurate and complete reﬂection 0f the
original, and for What purpose it was made. The State disclosed the
existence of the copy 0n July 8, 2015 and Ish was given a copy 0n October
21, 2015 after Ish ﬁled a Motion t0 Compel.
This instant Motion to Compel was not for the actual DVD copy,
because Ish now has that, but rather for an explanation as t0 Where the DVD
copy came from and why it took so long to be produced to the defense.
(R., pp.

450-5 1 .)
Rather than treat the motion as one to compel, the

0f “spoliation/destruction 0f evidence.”
original Videotape

was destroyed

The

it

as an issue

district court

found that the

16-month inventory of the

entire evidence

(R., p. 451.)

as a result 0f a

district court treated

room and destruction 0f all “unnecessary evidence ﬁles” in Which “thousands 0f items were
destroyed.” (R., p. 453.) Although the Video should not have been destroyed, because the
investigation

was

original Video,

still

open,

it

was “inadvertently destroyed.”

even though “a mistake and not in

line

(Id.)

The destruction of the

With policy,” was a matter that

“slipped through the cracks, through no overt or malicious action of those involved.” (Id.)

26

The

district court further

completing the inventory,

was done before
54.)

found that the destruction was done by “evidence technicians”

Who “had n0

was charged and

Ish

Based 0n these

idea What

that

was 0n the tape” and that the

he was not a suspect in the case.

facts, the district court

destruction

(R., pp.

concluded that there was no bad

453-

faith in the

destruction 0f the original Video. (R., pp. 453-54.) “Because n0 evidence exists showing

that anything

in

bad

on

faith the

that tape

was exculpatory, nor

that the destruction

0f said tape was done

Court ﬁnds that Ish’s due process rights were not violated.”

Ish requested an instruction

0n the spoliation

doctrine.

court declined to give the instruction. (TL, p. 1551, L. 20

— p.

(R., p. 914.)

The

district

1556, L. 19.)

On appeal Ish argues the district court erred in relation t0 both rulings.

VHS

(R., p. 454.)

was destroyed

(Appellant’s

bad

faith.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 46-47.) This argument fails because he has failed to claim,

much

brief, pp. 41-51.)

First,

he argues the original

less demonstrate, clear error.

Second, Ish argues the

requested instruction on the spoliation doctrine.

argument
Violation.

fails

tape

in

district court erred in refusing his

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 47-51.)

This

because a spoliation instruction would be a remedy for a Youngblood

Having found no Youngblood

Violation, the district court properly declined to

give the instruction.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Trial court orders

on motions

t0 dismiss are

reviewed using an abuse of discretion

standard. State V. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184, 45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002).

properly instructed
review.

is

Whether a jury was

a question 0f law over which the appellate court exercises free

Miller V. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000).

27

A trial

court’s factual determinations will

be overturned only upon a showing 0f clear

State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217,

The District Court’s Finding Of
Competent Evidence

C.

error.

E

222 (2008).

No Bad

Faith

Is

BV

Supported

“The government’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence

Substantial,

t0 the defendant

in a criminal case includes the duty t0 use earnest efforts to preserve evidence for possible

use by the defense.” Nelson

V. State,

157 Idaho 847, 856, 340 P.3d 1163, 1172

“This constitutional obligation t0 preserve evidence

2014).

is

(Ct.

App.

however, t0

limited,

evidence that possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed and

is

of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable

evidence by any other reasonably available means.” Li. (citing California

467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). Where the evidence

is

Trombetta,

V.

of unknown exculpatory value, “a due

process Violation will be established only if the defendant shows that the government acted
in

bad

faith.” Li. (citing

Arizona V.oungblood, 488 U.S. 5 1 58 (1988)). “Bad
,

faith is

more

than mere negligence” and “refers t0 a calculated effort to circumvent” the duty t0 disclose
exculpatory evidence. State V. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 67, 156 P.3d 565, 568 (2007). “While
the state has a duty t0 use earnest efforts to preserve evidence for possible use

defendant, the state does not have a general duty t0 gather evidence for the accused.”

w,

109 Idaho 373, 375, 707 P.2d 484, 486

The

district court

(Ct.

is

found that the destruction 0f the

supported by the record.

(E,

Indeed, given the nature of the evidence and the

28

a

m

App. 1985).

VHS

tape

was

something that “slipped through the cracks” during a 16-month inventory.
This ﬁnding

by

generally, 3/16/16 Tr.

manner of its

inadvertent,

(R., p. 453.)

(Aug, pp.

destruction, “it

3-24).)

is illogical

that the exculpatory nature

law enforcement such
effort to prevent [Ish]

m,

of the evidence,

that they could

from

utilizing

it

if it existed at all,

have deliberately disposed of the evidence in an
at trial

(and thus acting in bad faith).” Nelson

157 Idaho 847, 856, 340 P.3d 1163, 1172

Because the

district court’s

ﬁnding

(Ct.

that the destruction

the evidence presented in relation t0 the motion, there

Ish contends that he

bad

showed

would have been apparent t0

App. 2014) (emphasis

was not

in

bad

faith is

was n0 due process

the destruction 0f the

VHS

original).

supported by

Violation.

surveillance tape

was

relevant consideration.

(Ct.

E, gg, State V. Casselman,

App. 2005). The

(R., p. 453.)

Although

the only evidence.

The

district court,

failure t0 follow

district court

however, considered that failure in
procedures was evidence of bad

weighed

show

a

that evidence,

its

analysis.

faith, it

was not

and the other evidence, and

faith.

(R., pp. 453-54.)

Ish has

clear error.

Because The

D.

is

141 Idaho 592, 596, 114 P.3d 150,

found that the destruction was negligent but not in bad
failed t0

in

because police practices and policies regarding the destruction of evidence were

faith

not followed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 46-47.5) Certainly failure to follow procedures

154

V.

District Court

Found No Bad

Faith,

The Spoliation Doctrine Did Not

Apgly

“A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction Which is not supported
by the evidence.

State V. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881,

736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State

Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82

5

Ish also claims Detective

and

at

trial

Brown gave

inconsistent testimony

regarding where he obtained the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 46-47.)

Detective

Brown

obtained the

(Ct.

V.

App. 1986) (self—defense

between a

pre-trial

hearing

DVD

Ish does not state

copy of the surveillance tape.
what relevance evidence of where

DVD copy over a year after the destruction 0f the VHS tape

has t0 his claim of bad faith regarding the destruction of the

29

VHS tape.

instruction not supported

by

inference under the spoliation doctrine

process Violation.” Stuart

“In a criminal case, application 0f a favorable

evidence).

is

the appropriate

Courtney

V.

Big

O

Youngblood due

for a

127 Idaho 806, 816, 907 P.2d 783, 793 (1995). “[T]he

V. State,

merely negligent loss or destruction of evidence
doctrine.”

remedy

is

not sufﬁcient to invoke the spoliation

Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824,

87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003).

Because the destruction 0f the evidence was merely negligent, there was no Youngblood
Because there was no Youngblood Violation, the

Violation.

court correctly

district

concluded that Ish was not entitled to a Youngblood remedy.
Ish contends the district court “failed to recognize that the

whether Mr. Ish’s due process rights were violated

is

same test for determining

not the applicable standard as t0

Whether the requested jury instruction was appropriate.” (Appellant’s
Ish,

and not the

Who

district court,

same standard as

is

incorrect. “In the civil context, this

in criminal cases.” Garcia V. State

610, 615, 38 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2002) (citing

applying the Youngblood standard in a
value of the destroyed evidence
faith.”

good

Li.

faith.

is

M,

civil case).

unknown

Finally,

O Tires,

Inc.,

139 Idaho

Ish’s reliance

127 Idaho

Under both

at 824,

Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592
decision

was reversed by

(Ariz.

the

at 816,

907 P.2d

at

793 and

standards, if the evidentiary

upon

87 P.3d

at

the presence or absence 0f

933.

on the “balancing approach” of

(Appellant’s brief, p. 46-49.)

Court applies the

“the inquiry focuses on the presence of bad

prejudice, as articulated in State V. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 95,

misplaced.

It is

Tax Comm’n of State of ID, 136 Idaho

In short, spoliation, like due process, hinges

Big

brief, p. 50.)

One 0f the

App. 1986). Li

3O

culpability with

m

774 P.2d 252, 265 (1989),

sources for that test

at 93,

Supreme Court 0f

state

774 P.2d

the United

at

was

is

263. However, that

States

in

Arizona

V.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).

The balancing approach has been

rejected as the

m

appropriate due process standard in favor 0f the bad faith approach of Youngblood.
Tellingly, the “balancing approach” has not

Edﬂ,

been employed since kin.

E, gg,

145 Idaho 694, 698-99, 183 P.3d 782, 786-87 (Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing FLin).

The proper

test is the

Finally,

even

0f the correct bad
district court

bad

faith test

of Youngblood, not the “balancing approach.”

“balancing test” were appropriate,

if a

faith test,

proved n0 prejudice

0fthe bar, not the parking

lot

application, like application

shows no spoliation of evidence. The

found, that the destruction of the tape

54.) In balance, Ish has

its

at all.

was

at

proved, and the

most negligent.

(R., pp.

The recording covered only the

where the homicide occurred. (TL,

Ls. 1-9; 3/16/16 T11, p. 4, Ls. 18-21.)

state

p.

interior

615, Ls. 5-17; p. 1348,

Four witnesses testiﬁed about events inside the

and Ish himself relayed substantially the same version of events inside the bar

— p.

statement to police. (Tr., p. 524, L. 4
L. 18

—

p.

articulate

673, L.

how

5; p.

the tape

687, L. 9

in

in his

p. 651, L. 6; p.

664,

Even applying

less

show

that its destruction

the rej ected balancing approach test Ish can

error.

The
done

trial.

—

bar,

694, L. 13; State’s Exhibit 46(2).) Ish has failed t0

would have beneﬁted him, much

prejudiced his defense at

show n0

— p.

588, L. 23; p. 618, L. 3

453-

district court

bad

faith.

concluded that the destruction 0f the surveillance tape was not

Thus, there was neither a due process Violation nor a spoliation of

evidence. Ish has failed to

show

error.
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VI.
Ish

A.

Has Shown No Error

In

The

District Court’s

Introduction

Prior t0

trial,

the defense asked for jury instructions related t0 the included offense

of voluntary manslaughter.

(R., pp. 902-03.)

provided

jury had to

that, to convict, the

The

p. 903.)

Instruction

70;

Answer T0 The Jury Question

district court

Tr., p.

of Red Elk.

that Ish “caused the death”

(R.,

gave the defense proposed instructions on manslaughter as

No. 24, With some modiﬁcations. (Compare

ﬂ alﬂ

R., pp.

902-03

ﬂ

R., pp. 1169-

1550, Ls. 7- 1 5.) Like the proposed instructions, the elements instruction

0n voluntary manslaughter provided
the death”

ﬁnd

In relevant part, the proposed instruction

ofRed Elk.

(R., p. 1170.

that, to convict, the

E

alﬂ R., pp.

jury had to

ﬁnd

that Ish “caused

899, 1165 (proposed and given murder

instructions with “caused the death” language).)

Ish also requested an instruction

ﬁnding

With

906.)

deat

that Ish

”

0n involuntary manslaughter, Which required a

committed an unlawful act

that

“produced the death” 0f Red Elk.

similar modiﬁcations, this instruction

language as Instruction N0. 26.

was

(R., p.

also given with the “produced the

(R., p. 1172.)

During deliberations the jury tendered a question “trying

t0 understand” the

difference between “produced the death” as used in the involuntary manslaughter

instruction

and “caused the death” as used

manslaughter.

(Tr., p.

1645, Ls. 7-14.)

in the elements instruction for involuntary

Ish’s trial counsel argued that

n0 deﬁnitions be

provided, and that the jury be instructed to “follow the instructions as provided.” (Tr., p.

1645, Ls. 22-25.) The district court concluded that the terms were synonymous, and that
the jury should be so instructed. (Tr., p. 1646, L.

32

1

— p.

1647, L. 3.)

On

appeal Ish argues the district court erred by concluding “caused” and

“produced” are synonymous, and thus “negated any difference between the two
manslaughters.”

This argument

(Appellant’s brief, p. 52.)

because there

fails

is

no

difference in the causal elements of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Idaho’s

appellate

courts

review “whether a jury was given proper

freely

215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009).

instructions.” State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710,

C.

The

Court Correctly Told The Jury That There
Death And Producing A Death

District

Causing

A

The model jury

provides

instruction

the

Is

No

causation

Difference Between

of voluntary

element

manslaughter as follows: “the defendant [name] engaged in conduct which caused the
death 0f [name 0f decedent].”

I.C.J.I.

708 (brackets

The model jury

original).

on involuntary manslaughter provides the causation element
[commission]

[or]

[attempted commission] ofthe unlawful

death 0f [name of decedent].

I.C.J.I.

713 (brackets

presumptively correct. Trial courts should follow the
creating unnecessary grounds for appeal.”

act,

McKay

as

V. State,

follows:

“in

the

the defendant produced the

original).

I.C.J.I. as

instruction

“The

I.C.J.I.

are

closely as possible to avoid

148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225

P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010).

The terms “caused” and “produced”
“Cause”

is

deﬁned

as

“something

as

used

in these instructions are

brings

that

(https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/cause

“Produce”

is

deﬁned

an

about

(last

effect

Visited

synonymous.

or

April

a

result.”

2,

2019).)

as “t0 cause to have existence or to happen.” (https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionarv/produce

(last Visited

April 2, 2019).)
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Thus, the dictionary uses

“cause” as

its

deﬁnition of “produce.” Likewise, in Idaho law, “cause”

0f the word “produce.” Thompson
Mar.

2019) (“Thompson’s reasoning

4,

word

V. State,

No. 45954, 2019

is circular,

WL

is

deﬁned by use

1010442,

as he contends

at

*7 (Idaho

0n one hand

that the

‘produces’ requires an instruction on proximate cause, but the instruction 0n

proximate cause utilizes the word ‘produces’”).
manslaughter instruction uses the

common law

Despite the fact that the voluntary

term “caused the death” While the

involuntary manslaughter instruction uses the statutory phrase “produced the death,” the
causation elements of the two crimes are the same. Indeed, involuntary manslaughter
lesser included offense

of voluntary manslaughter,

ﬂ,

gg,

is

a

State V. Padilla, 101 Idaho

713, 717, 620 P.2d 286, 290 (1980), which would be impossible if the two crimes had
different causation elements.

The district court correctly concluded that “caused the deat

and “produced the death” were merely different ways

t0 express the

”

same causation

element.

Ish argues that voluntary

and involuntary manslaughter “require differing levels of

causation.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 58.) Ish apparently argues that if he struck

the

blow caused

but if he struck

his death,

Red Elk and Red Elk was

“produced” the death and
p. 61.)

He

he “caused” the death and

is

First, Ish cites

legal distinction

guilty of voluntary manslaughter,

killed because

he

fell t0

the pavement, then Ish

guilty only of involuntary manslaughter.

asserts that “caused” requires “a step

“produced.” (Appellant’s

is

brief, p. 62.)

more of volition by

suffered because of the blow.

(Appellant’s brief,
the defendant” than

This argument lacks merit.

n0 relevant Idaho authority supporting

between whether the

Red Elk and

injuries resulted

his

argument

from the blow

that there is a

itself or

from the

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,
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fall

970

(1996)

(“When

on appeal

issues

are not supported

argument, they Will not be considered”).
addresses Idaho law nor

He

by propositions 0f

law, authority, 0r

on Ninth Circuit authority

relies

that neither

relevant t0 the question 0f Whether “caused” the death 0r

is

“produced” the death describe the same causal element.
Second, his theory has been

Where Red Elk suffered

at least implicitly rejected.

The

by being knocked

factual scenario Ish

pavement,

is

the

scenario presented in State V. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 372, 128 P.3d 908, 909 (2005).

In

describes,

fatal injuries

that case Porter fought the Victim in the parking lot outside a bar,

him to
lay

fall to

the pavement,

on the ground.”

including brain

damage

punching him and causing

Where he punched the Victim “two 0r three more times

The Victim “suffered extensive

I_d.

to the

likely

injuries to his face

as [he]

and head,

caused by his head hitting thepavement after he was knocked

unconscious” and “died from the injuries.”

I_d.

(emphasis added).

Rejecting Porter’s

argument that the proper charge was involuntary manslaughter because he did not intend
t0 kill the Victim, this

Court held that Porter was properly charged With murder and

manslaughter. Li. at 375, 128 P.3d at 912. Ish’s claim he was guilty of only involuntary

manslaughter under the same fact pattern as Porter
there

by

is

is

without merit. Ish’s argument that

a distinction between Whether the fatal injuries were caused

striking the

pavement

manslaughter while the
Third,

as a result 0f those blows, the former being

latter is

competing

unprecedented, theory:

by his blows

involuntary manslaughter,

hypotheticals

show

the

is

0r caused

murder 0r voluntary

without legal support.

error

of

Ish’s

proposed,

In both hypotheticals the defendant places and detonates a

in a building, killing a Victim.

establishes that the Victim died

and

bomb

In the ﬁrst hypothetical forensic analysis conclusively

from the bomb
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blast. In the

second hypothetical forensic

analysis conclusively establishes that the Victim died as a result 0f the building collapsing

as a result ofthe

bomb blast. Under Ish’s theory the bomber “caused” but did not “produce”

the death 0f the Victim in the ﬁrst hypothetical

and thus

is

guilty 0f

murder or voluntary

manslaughter, while the defendant in the second hypothetical “produced” but did not

“cause” the death and

is

is

therefore guilty only 0f involuntary manslaughter. Ish’s argument

facially meritless.

Under Idaho law,
is

the mental state.

respectively)

is

the difference between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter

The causation element (“caused

the same.

Ish has failed t0

show

the death” and “produced the death,”

error in the district court’s so instructing

the jury over his obj ection that the district court merely refer the jury to their instructions.

VII.

Ish

Under
themselves,

Has Shown N0 Cumulative Error

the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of

may

in the aggregate

show

the absence of a fair

Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).
cumulative error doctrine

is

n0

trial.

errors,

harmless in

State V. Martinez, 125

necessary predicate to application of the

a ﬁnding of more than one error. State V. Hawkins, 131 Idaho

396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

are, therefore,

A

trial

As

set forth above, Ish

errors t0 cumulate.
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has failed t0 show error. There

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm Ish’s judgment 0f conviction.

11th day of April, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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